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ABSTRACT
The next generation of mobile communications systems
is expected to offer new business opportunities to
existing and new market players. A market-based
middleware framework has been recently proposed
whereby service providers, independent of network
operators, are able to tender online service contracts to
network operators in a dynamic and competitive
manner. This facilitates a seamless service provision
over disparate networks in a consumer-centric manner.
Service providers select network bearers according to
the network operators' ability to meet the QoS arget,
which in turn is influenced, among other things, by
user's price and quality requirements.  The benefits of
this proposal are the complementarity of numerous
network resources, the decoupling of services and
networks in a self-organising distributed environment,
and increased competition to consumers’ advantage.
1. INTRODUCTION
The provision of services as systems evolve beyond the
3rd generation is very challenging.  Users will want
access to more services, and the services themselves will
be more diverse and have a greater range of
requirements.  Higher capacities will be needed, forcing
a move to smaller cell sizes and air interfaces optimised
to the specific environment.  The trend towards hybrid
networks with multiple air interfaces is likely to
increase.  Existing management approaches are not
flexible enough to adapt to these changes.
An economy is an example of a highly complex
distributed system. The Scottish economist, Adam
Smith, argued in his seminal work The Wealth of
Nations that a market was the optimal way of allocating
a society’s resources and satisfying both producers and
consumers [3].  He also defined a number of principles
required for such a market process to operate fairly
which still hold true today.
In this paper, we describe the recent digital
marketplace proposals which allow use a market to
control services within a mobile communication system.
We explain the features of the marketplace and the
reasoning behind the concept.  We also place the digital
marketplace in context with some other similar
proposals for the distributed control of systems.
2. EXISTING TRENDS IN SERVICE PROVISION
It is almost certain that the environment for the
provision of services beyond 3G will have changed
considerably from the current view as 3G is being
deployed.  Two significant trends are towards a
separation of service and transport provision, and more
flexible pricing strategies.
2.1Separation of Service and Transport
Many countries are moving to introduce competition in
utility services.  A feature of such services, which
interestingly does not apply to mobile radio, is that they
are often provided over a fixed infrastructure which is
difficult to duplicate.  Examples include electricity, gas
or water supply.  In these cases, the infrastructure is
shared and separate service providers compete to supply
customers over this infrastructure.
This separation between service providers and those
providing transport – network operators – was
envisaged in the UMTS business model. Mobile radio
does not require a single infrastructure, but the
registration and paging arrangements do require them to
be connected to a single network.  An example of the
separate service provider concept already in existence in
2G systems is Mobile Virtual Network Operators
(MVNOs) [9], who sell there own services but use a
separate network operator to connect to their users.
2.2Pricing
Consumers tend to dislike uncertainty.  When offered a
choice between fixed monthly charges and a price per
call, there is a tendency to select the fixed price option
even where there may be savings by working on a per
call basis.  However, demand based charging has the
advantage of forcing more efficient use of scarce
resources.
Fitkov-Norris and Khanifar [2] consider the effect
on usage of a mobile communication system with
dynamic pricing, and argue that dynamic pricing can be
used in order to allow a network operator to maximise
evenue.  However, although they consider the effects of
user mobility so that users may wait until they move out
of a high price area before making a call, their system
does not consider the possibility of users switching
between operators.  This paper contains useful
references to other work on dynamic pricing in the
communications and utility fields.
The separation of service providers and network
oper tors gives a further opportunity for dynamic
pricing, since the network operator can charge a
dynamic price to the service provider without the
customer being aware of the fact.  This is commonly
done in the case of electricity supply, for example.
Diff rent service providers can offer different service
packages and pricing structures to users.  In general
such systems work well; the recent problems in
California being the result of regulation on the end price
to users without corresponding regulation on the price
from producers.  Returning to Smith, in a true market-
based system, requirements to regulate prices are
replaced by a requirement to regulate the market to
ensure free competition.
3. REQUIREMENTS OF A MARKET BASED SYSTEM
In The Wealth of Nations [3], Smith argues that for a
market to establish a fair price in return for a
commodity, producers and customers must have free
access to the market. Smith also argues that such a
system will produce a satisfactory outcome for
producers and consumers, and also allocate the
resources of the society optimally.
The market itself can be relatively easily provided.
Agents have been proposed as a means for controlling
telecommunication systems [4]. A marketplace can be
provided as a venue for these agents to negotiate.
The requirement that the market operate ‘freely’ is,
however, much more difficult to meet. The requirements
can be broken down as follows
1. Producers must be able to advertise their wares and
be able to sell to any consumer.
2. Consumers must be able to buy from any producer
they wish to.
3. ‘Products’ – i.e., the service, must be well described.
4. Producers and consumers must be able to trust each
other.
5. Given that the radio interface is unreliable, and so
‘product quality’ cannot be absolutely guaranteed,
th re must be a fair method of specifying how much
confidence a consumer can place on the ‘product’.
An implied consequence of the first two requirements is
that there is more than one provider and that the services
from different providers are interchangeable.  This is
termed substitutability [10].  It does not imply that the
services have to be identical; just that the consumer is
able to choose one service over another, otherwise an
effect monopoly operates.  However, the mobile market
is already sufficiently mature that this is the case.
Having specified the requirements, we will now
describe the digital marketplace environment which
fulfill them and so allow a market to operate.
4. THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
The Digital Marketplace is a central point for trading
transport and services.  Many different marketplaces
would be distributed throughout the network, each one
dealing with trading for a relatively homogenous part of
the system (Figure 1).  Marketplaces are agent based,
with different parties to the negotiation represented by
agents. Users wishing to make a call, or their service
provider, will send a Service Agent to the marketplace
in order to seek bids from network providers willing and
able to provide the required service to the mobile.  Each
network providing coverage in the area of the
marketplace will have a Network
Agent.  These Network Agents
will make bids to the Service
Agents, which will choose the
most appropriate (cheapest,
highest quality, etc) for its needs.
The business relationships
between these entities is shown in
Figure 2. The business model
exhibits some similarities with the
already proposed TINA-C
business model [12]. However, it
has been elaborated introducing
the ability that both service and
transport could be negotiated.
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Figure 1 Digital Marketplaces
5. MANAGING TRADING IN THE MARKET
In order for the digital marketplace for provide a free
market, the five requirements identified above must be
satisfied. The first two requirements relate to
accessibility, the third to transparency (networks may be
using different technologies, so a common description of
the service to be provided must be defined), and the
final two to accountability.
5.1The Requirements of Accessibility
Criteria (1) is relatively simple to achieve, as it simple
requires that all producers – network operators – register
in the marketplace.  If the marketplace consists of a
number of separate entities distributed throughout an
area, this has a useful bonus.  Network providers which
only provide service over small areas can still register in
their local market and attract customers.  This large base
of small suppliers helps to introduce competition in to
the market.  Small providers, using the IEEE 802.11
WLAN standard, are already offering services in airport
terminals and restaurants, but lack a way of advertising
their service to passing user terminals.
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Figure 3: Digital Marketplace within a layered structure
In order to achieve requirement (2), hat any
consumer can purchase from any producer (technology
permitting), each radio access network supplies a
Logical Market Channel (LMC) (Figure 3), a common
access channel which mobiles can use to initiate
transactions.  To ensure independence, these control
channels will be contracted with network operators by
the marketplace.  The marketplace may be run by a
regulatory body, or more likely by a consortium of
network operators or single network operator on behalf
of the regulatory body.  Due to the nature of the
marketplace, it is quite likely that a user may contract
for a service with a different network operator from the
one providing the LMC.  System efficiency can be
improved by sharing these channels so that only one or
two are provided per access technology.  Each Service
Agent, created in the market in response to the call
initiation, registers with the Market Agent and can
ther fore verify that its request has reached the
mark tplace intact.
Users or their Service Providers will put in special
contracts to the marketplace for paging and location
updates to allow them to receive incoming calls.  This
signalling will normally imply a cost, and some users,
particularly those of data services, might not wish to
make use of a facility to receive connections.
5.2The Requirement of Transparency
In order to allow a fair comparison between different
network providers, with possibly heterogeneous
networks, a generic description of the service is
required.  This description forms part of a contract
b tween the user or their service provider and the
network operator, and it is these contracts that the
Network Agents place bids to provide.
Three basic parameters covering what has to be
transported are:
¨ Bit rate (T): the minimum bit rate to be offered.
¨ BER: a maximum BER acceptable by the service.
¨ Delay: the maximum delay tolerated by the service.
However, these parameters are not sufficient in and of
themselves to describe communications in a variable
environment such as a wireless system.  Therefore, the
concept of a degradation allowance is also defined.  The
degradation allowance is the proportion of the service
which may be allowed to fall below the contracted
parameters.  A degradation allowance of 0 would imply
that the contracted parameters would always have to be
maintained for the contract to be met.  Such a situation
is difficult to guarantee, and so such calls would be
expensive.  Increasing the degradation allowance would
make the contract easier to meet, and therefore is likely
to attract cheaper bids from Network Agents.  To
support the degradation allowance, three additional
parameters are defined as part of the contract:
¨ Degradation Allowance: the proportion of measures
which are allowed to be non-compliant with the
three performance parameters over a sliding
window.
¨ Sampling rate: the rate at which measures are
performed.
¨ Monitoring Period: the length of the sliding window.
An extension of the fixed contract is a multimode
contract where different services are provided at
diff rent points in time.  Multimode contracts allow
more of the quality of service management to be
devolved to individual network elements, simplifying
network management at the expense of more variability
in the service provided to the user (see [6]).
5.3The Requirements of Conformance
Requirement (4), that network operators and service
providers trust each other, is fairly easy to meet using
authentication mechanisms, since these parties will have
long term relationships within the marketplace.  Users
whi h have contracts with service providers will be
trusted through their service provider.
A user may choose not to have a relationship with a
service provider by generating an agent and access the
market directly.  If they do this, they are unlikely to be
trusted.   An ‘up front’ payment by means for electronic
cash could be used in this eventuality.
Requirement (5) is difficult to meet given that the
trading system is operating on an individual call level, as
it is difficult for a user to make meaningful
measurements with regard to overall performance.  A
user either receives the contracted quality or not.  For
this reason, the market maintains a reputation for each
network operator, which represents their ability to meet
past contracts based on information passed to them by
Network and Service Agents.  Service Agents can take a
network’s reputation into account when considering bids
as well as simply considering the offered cost [1].
6. OPERATION OF THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
As an example of how the digital marketplace system
works, consider a mobile user which is not attached to
any network infrastructure but is wishing to originate an
outgoing communications session. The user has a valid
subscription contract with a service provider. The user's
terminal first scans radio channels seeking an LMC
broadcast signal associated with the reachable
marketplace. Once the LMC located, the terminal
transmits a session contract stating quality and price
requirements through the LMC along with its
identification and the identification of its associated
service provider. The market agent analyses the
connection request and forwards it to the service
provider. The service provider analyses the request and,
if compliant with the subscription contract, calls for bids
in the marketplace where the user is located. Registered
network operators propose bids on the contract tender(s)
and the service provider selects the one(s) which best
suits the contract requirements. The sequ nce of
interactions involved in the process is given by the
following functional steps (see Figure 4):
1. The user generates a connection request (Conn.Req)
through the LMC to the Market Agent (MA). A
session contract is embedded in the request.
2. The MA forwards the connection request to the
User Home Agent (UHA). The UHA is active on
the service provider domain. The UHA location is
embedded in the registration request generated by
the User Terminal Agent (UTA).
3. The UHA migrates the Service Provider Agent
(SPA) to the marketplace where the user is located.
4. The SPA split the session contract into several flow
contracts and tenders each flow contract to Network
Agents (NA).
5. NAs propose back bids for the flow contracts.
6. The SPA selects the NAs that are the most suitable
to support the session.
7. NOAs that have been selected by the SPA to
support the flows confirm to the UTA that the flows
are established.
8. Once the session communication ends then the
UTA releases each flow by sending connection
release signals to the selected NAs.
9. NAs reports on commitments to the MA. The MA
updates the associated decommitment penalties.
10. The NAs inform the SPA that the session has
ended.
11. The SPA updates the UHA state with the billing
information related to the session.
12. The SPA is removed from the marketplace.
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Figure 4 Establishment of an Outgoing Session
The previous scenario was concerned with the trading of
a set of flow contracts for the support of a
communications session. Another type of contract is
introduced in the framework to enable service providers
to keep track of the location of their mobile users in
order to route incoming sessions. The location and
paging contract is negotiated in a digital marketplace
and states that the network operator will keep track of
the user location and page the user when requested by
t  service provider. The dissociation of
communications services, as specified by flow contracts,
and location and paging services means that a user
might be paged for incoming calls by a network operator
but could use the services of another network operator
for the transport of the call traffic.
This dissociation of signalling also means that the
c sts of signalling become explicit, at least to the
service provider (which is likely to provide a ‘package
deal’ to the user). This avoids cross-subsidy between
users which is another important feature of a fair market.
Pricing strategies within the digital marketplace can
be simple or complex depending on the wishes of the
operators. The strategies for service providers and
network operators will be different.
A simple strategy for a network operator would be to
charge a fixed price for each resource, accepting calls
only where a commitment over a certain level can be
given, and blocking calls when no resource is available.
A complex strategy would see prices raised to cover the
level of commitment which is being offered, as well as
the prices charged by other operators and the level of
remaining resources an operator has.
A service provider, on the other hand, will have an
agreement negotiated with a user covering the type of
calls which will be served and the cost of each call. The
cost to the user is likely to be, at least relatively, fixed.
For this reason, if the cost in the market is high, a
service provider may block a call even though resources
were available to serve it.  However, it would only be
able to do this if its customer agreement allowed it to do
so.  A user may pay a premium for special service,
requiring the service provider to facilitate its connection
whatever the cost.
Example negotiating strategies and price fluctuations
are described in [1].
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Figure 5 Pricing for cellular vs WLAN.
As an example, Figure 5 shows the example of a
marketplace with three operators, two cellular operators
competing with a WLAN operator.  The cellular
operates cover the entire area of the marketplace, while
the WLAN operator has more limited coverage, and so
cannot offer such a high commitment.  Users in the
system are split between ‘business’ users, who are
prepared to pay a high price for service, and ‘personal’
users, who are price consious and will defer a call if the
price is high.  The load in this case steadily increases
from the start of the simulation where the available
traffic is 75% of capacity to about the 2500 auction
mark where it is 25% above capacity, then falling back
to the 75% level.  As load increases, the cellular
operators, which can serve all users, are able to
significantly increase their prices.  As the load increases
still further, the WLAN operator, although operating in
limited areas, is able to raise its prices to similar levels,
but cannot exceed the cellular operators’ prices.  At this
point most personal users do not find the prices
worthwhile, so business users predominate. As load
decreases, the WLAN has to maintain a slight discount
to the celluar operators to maintain loads and is not as
flexible in responding to fluctuations in load as it has
fewer users in its coverage area.
7. MULTIPLE MARKETPLACES
The forgoing description of the digital marketplace
concentrates on its use to negotiate a connection from a
radio access network to a fixed network and a service on
that network.  However, the concept applies equally
within these networks so that calls may be routed
through the influence of multiple marketplaces between
there origin and destination.  Intermediate routing may
b  in luenced by the prices obtained in each of these
markets.
There are two options for controlling the call in this
circumstance: retained responsibility and devolved
responsibility [11]. With retained responsibility, the
SPA migrates to each marketplace in turn to negotiate a
leg of the call.  With devolved responsibility, the SPA
negotiates with a NA which is willing to transport the
call to its destination, and that NA may then use pre-
existing agreements with network providers in other
marketplaces to complete the call or itself conduct the
necessary negotiations if it cannot transport the call
itself.  The second option is likely to carry a premium,
since the network operator is risking its reputation
through the actions of the other network providers it
employs to carry the traffic.
8. RELATED PROPOSALS
The IST SHUFFLE programme [5] is currently
examining somewhat similar ideas for the distributed
control of 3G networks [7].  They too proposal an agent
based system for the control of resources, although
focus is more on the control of resources within a
network than to the control for services between, as well
as within, networks.  They consider dynamic agreements
between service providers and network operators on a
call by call basis as being too demanding in terms of
computation and signalling, and settle instead for what
amounts to a futures trading system, where service
providers purchase the option to use network operators
in the future rather than when the call is set up.
Such a proposal can be considered as a subset of the
digital marketplace proposal, as there is nothing to
prevent the contract negotiated between the NA and the
SPA covering several calls.  Indeed, in a similar manner,
the MVNO system is another specific example, with a
very long term arrangement between a service provider
and a single network operator.  However, the full
benefits of the digital marketplace in terms of open
competition and the ability for local suppliers to operate
effectively in the market only accrue when there is the
possibility (not necessarily realised) of switching to
another operator for the call.  Fixed long term
agreements distort the market and break the
supply/demand cost/price relationship, and either the
producer or the consumer will lose out [3].
Negotiation procedures in the digital marketplace do
not add greatly to signalling since although it is possible
to renegotiate a contract with a network operator within
an ongoing call should quality degrade, this is unlikely if
multi-mode contracts of the type described in [6] are
used.  Where the additional signalling does become
significant is if the service provider tries to route a call
through several digital marketplaces and negotiate in
each [11].
9. DISCUSSION
On  of the framework’s key features is to let suppliers
and customers of communications services negotiate in a
fair a d competitive environment. The price charged for
services will therefore be competitive and dynamically
variable in line with demand and supply. In current
mobile systems, the pricing schemes have been
borrowed from the ones established for fixed telephony:
time-based pricing (off peak and peak periods) with a
subscription fee. The price paid by end users does not
therefore reflect the underlying radio resource cost. For
instance, it is less re ource-consuming for a network
operator to accommodate a communications session in
the residential area of a city during the office hours.
Why, then, during the office hours, a user should be
charged at a peak rate when still located in the
residential area? Why is a user in the residential area
charged as much as another user in the business area
where the radio resources are scarcer? This is not an
optimal use of resources, which would encourage use
where resources are plentiful and discourage their use
when resources are scarce. This requires pricing
strategies more representative of the use of radio
resources; a price for peak price geographical zone and
a price for off-peak geographical zone. Applications that
would benefit from this scheme are callback services [8]
and range from email download to automatic organiser
update. The definition of pricing strategies goes beyond
the scope of this article but it is expected that the digital
marketplace based framework will allow the
introduction of fairer pricing schemes and novel
applications that efficiently exploit the radio resources.
It is accepted that while most economists would
agree that a fair market is in practice the optimal way to
allocate resources, it is not globally optimal.  The
market in pizzas is a good example.  In the ce tre of
most cities it is possible find several fast food pizza
restaurants, all selling basically the same product.  It
would be more efficient to provide only a single
restaurant, to which anyone wishing to purchase a pizza
would go.  This would equate to the case of a centrally
planned economy.  However, while a centrally planned
economy can in theory be more efficient than a market-
based one, in practice there are inevitably errors in
estimating demand leading to shortages or surpluses,
and consequent inefficiencies.
The traditional mobile radio system is a centrally
planned system.  Resources are shared between radio
access points in a centrally controlled manner.  For such
a system to operate, we require perfect information on
the state of each part of the system. If such information
is available, then they will outperform a digital
marketplace based system.  However, as systems get
larger and more diverse, this becomes increasingly
impractical, just as it does on an economic scale.
10.CONCLUSIONS
This article has presented the digital marketplace for the
management of mobile communications services. The
framework has been developed to meet the need of the
next generation of mobile systems by offering service
providers a market-based mid leware over which they
can develop applications independently from the
underlying network infrastructure. This is made possible
with the development of a generic quality-based
interface between the network infrastructure and the
application entities. Network operators also benefit from
the framework in the sense that by registering in a
marketplace, they can serve customers, which are not
necessarily their direct subscribers.
A free market will benefit the producers and
consumers in the market, but there are also benefits to
the regulatory authorities. The regulatory is presumably
interested in ensuring free competition, but an open
market will encourage investment by new players in the
industry, such as local operators, which is important
given the costs of providing the increased capacity new
services require. The presented approach for the
management of communications services represents an
enabling technology for the development of next
generation of communications systems in a multi-
vendor, multi-technology and multimedia environment.
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